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The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is an essential part of the smart water grid. One
of the daunting challenges in realizing the services in the AMI system is the security issue. In
this paper first we investigate the AMI communication system, and then address security
requirements for the AMI system. Especially we point out the different features of the water
meter and how these differences might affect developing security mechanisms. Second, we
address the implementation issues of the water meter in three aspects: key distribution,
deployment and implementation. Then, we propose possible approaches we take to develop
water meters briefly.
INTRODUCTION
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is one of the integral components of the smart
water grid where water consumption data is collected, stored, and transferred to the utility
Meter Data Management System (MDMS). The organizations which are directly involved in
promoting and developing the smart water grid have tried to figure out the operating scenarios
in the overall domain from water meters up to MDMS, and logical/physical components that
should be expected to exist to perform those operations in the full extent. However, how such
domain will take shape is still up in the air and requires some time until the actual
implementation are in full swing [1].
One of the difficult tasks in realizing the services in this domain is the security issue. While
the utility operation system, which is intrinsically the SCADA system, can be almost
completely isolated from the outside world from the communication point, the AMI system will
lie in the open domain. Since water meters are located in an open area, any cyber attack that is
excruciating service providers and users in the current network could take a toll on the services
in the smart water grid at the same level [2].
In this paper we consider AMI communication systems, and then address security
requirements for the AMI system. Although the requirements are very similar to the ones in the
power AMI system, water meters have different features from power meters. We will point out

these differences and how these different characteristics might influence developing security
mechanisms.
Second, we address development issues of the smart water meter in three aspects: key
distribution, deployment issues, and implementation. And then, we show briefly possible
approaches we take with consideration of unique characteristics of water meters.

Figure 1. AMI communication system
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
A typical network architecture of the water AMI communication system is shown in figure 1.
Meter Data Management System(MDMS) at the utility operating center collects all data from
smart meters at the consumer areas. Meters send data to the nearest concentrator which is called
a gateway in this figure and which may be placed on utility’s pole tops. Since they are likely to
use wireless communication, one single gateway can cover a very limited range within which
there are approximately no more than several hundreds of water meters. Gateways send data to
next level concentrators, making up several stages of traffic concentration until reaching the
head-end of a utility operating center, depending on its coverage. Servers placed in the utility
side behind the head-end perform various functions based on the collected data. If necessary,
they send control/management commands to meters. All the data and command are traversing
back and forth through the network.
In the smart grid, three distinct network domains are considered because they have different
characteristics and consequently require different communication technologies and network
topologies. First, the network domain which consists of in-premise devices and a smart meter is
called home area network(HAN). Next, the domain from the smart meters up to gateways or the
higher level of concentrators is called neighborhood area network(NAN). The last domain from
the concentrators and the utility head-end corresponds to wide area network(WAN) in which
typical optical fiber SDH or cellular communication technologies are commonly used.
In the smart water grid, HAN is unnecessary part since we consider only one device, a
water meter in the customer premise’s domain. NAN is contentious part since there is no

standard solution until now. For this likely multi-hop wireless network, different proprietary
approaches have been proposed and tried. But in order to deploy smart meters and construct
network in compatible way, utility companies and meter vendors realized the standard solution.
They worked together in the IEEE 802.15 working group and published IEEE 802.15.4g PHY
specification recently for the utility neighborhood area network which they also call is smart
utility networks(SUN) [3]. Even though they still have much work ahead, this effort laid
foundation for the deployment of interoperable AMI communication system.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The primary goal of the AMI security is to guarantee secure channels between water meters and
utility head-end. So far, cyber security requirements for the smart grid have been widely studied
and several survey papers have been published [4][5]. These works are very comprehensive,
and not AMI-specific even though they include AMI security as a part of their endeavor, Here,
we summarize the essential security requirements constrained to achieving secure
communication between water meters and the head-end., centering around fundamental
network security terminologies.
Meter authentication: the identity and authenticity of water meters and associated customers
should be verified before joining the network and receiving proper services.
Message confidentiality: Meters need to send usage and state information to the head-end
securely, and by the same token the head-ends also send commands or other critical information
to the meters safely. In other words, message contents should be secured not to be read by
illegitimate nodes.
Message authentication: Receivers need to verify that messages are sent from legitimate
senders. Adversaries can inject malicious messages to the either party, consequently causing
malfunctions. Meters require strong authentication of the operating servers when they receive
any command. On the contrary the server’s authentication requirement might be relatively
modest. In any case to verify the owner of messages is one of the most important security
requirements in many applications which will take place in the AMI system.
Message Integrity and freshness: Receivers need to make sure that the messages they receive
are not altered on the way by adversaries. It is also required that messages be recent, and old
messages not be reused by any adversary.
Message non-repudiation: Once sending a message, the sender of the message should not deny
sending it. This requirement might be necessary for proper billing.
These security requirements are almost the same as in the meters in the smart grid [4][5].
But from the point of practical deployment, water meters differ from meters in the power
system. The most salient point is that power will be supplied to water meters not by power lines
but by batteries. Thus, security protocols to meet these requirements for water meters should be
energy-sensitive, and for this reason the same protocols which can be applied to the power
system might not be feasible in water meters. Another point noteworthy is that water meters are

more likely to be installed in unprotected places than their peers in the power system, which
implies that they are more vulnerable to physical tampering.
CHALLENGES
Here, we consider three aspects of security challenges briefly for developing water meters to
meet the security requirements: key distribution, deployment, and implementation.
Key distribution: The building blocks of the security protocols are the cryptographic algorithms.
Every security protocol is based on the underlying encryption/decryption or hash function keys.
Thus, the key management including key establishment is an integral part of the security
mechanism. The big picture of the key management in the SCADA security mechanism may be
helpful to understand the nature of this challenge [6][7].
The public key algorithm is generally used as a convenient way in establishing a secure
channel for distributing a session key between two network nodes and in authenticating nodes.
However, the public key cryptography places computationally heavy burden on the resourceconstrained meters. Another approach is to use the symmetric key algorithm for distributing a
session key.
In addition to computational complexity, another important issue to choose the key
distribution scheme is scalability. Any key distribution method to be applied to the AMI
network should be operated in a large number of meters which have very restricted computing
power.
As described in the previous section the fact that a water meter is powered by a built-in
battery should be considered when we find the optimum security protocol including key
distribution. In this regard a security protocol for smart meters might not be appropriate to
apply to smart water meters although both have similar functions and the same security
requirements.
Deployment: Another big challenge in a practical sense is a deployment issue. The AMI in the
smart water grid will be built for an extended time and is not able to be installed overnight. As
mentioned before, one concentrator will cover approximately hundreds of household meters,
and the concentrator will be connected to the ultimate head-end through multiple stage of
integration. This tree-like topology can have various forms of network architecture including
ad-hoc multi-hop network. In addition to network topology, we will wait to see which
communication technology will be dominant.
There might be discrepancy in space domain as well as time domain. There will be two
different space domains which might have incongruous characteristics: residential areas and
non-residential areas such as reservoir or water control centers. The latter might be dependent
on different communication technology.
Considering this diverse deployment scenarios, we might need dual mode of the key
distribution and subsequent data exchange schemes. One is a negotiation-based method. In this
scheme either the public key or the pre-installed master keys in the devices can be used at the
every handshake stage to setup a session key. The other is free of any negotiation process to
setup a session key. Here, pre-defined key or keys embedded in the device is used as a session
key without any handshake process between a meter and a server. This scheme can obviate any
negotiating time, consequently reducing energy consumption because it can send data only

when it wants and receive data when it is awake from a server, otherwise it can stay in a sleep
mode.
Implementation: Current water meters basically have two functions: measurement and one-way
communication function. For secure communication each meter is also required to have security
function on top of them. And they will also have to accommodate some control function
depending on the extent of services that will be provided in the future water grid. Moreover, the
meters will be deployed in unmanned and unprotected location. So they have to be equipped
with a certain degree of tamper-proof mechanism. These requirements will restrict the options
which we can choose for the security protocol in overall, the key distribution method in
particular. To develop meters with those functions with reasonable cost will be one of major
practical issues in realizing the smart water AMI system.
SECURITY MEASURES
Due to the importance of security, some commercial meters equipped with security function are
already shown in the market, based on the public key management scheme [8]. Here, we
explain briefly the approaches we take to implement security measures for developing smart
water meters.
We assume that the security server at the utility operating center is a trusted base, and all
meters trust the server at the initial setup. At the creating time the server is given a key table
which consists of two master keys and terminal IDs. One key is a master encryption key used
for encrypting a session key. The other is a master authentication key used to verify the origin
and integrity of messages. Each meter is also given two master keys which are shared with the
server at the installation time, and can be identified by the meter ID. Session keys are
distributed from the server whenever necessary. And we assume that each meter can keep its
master keys without any harm.
At the initial registration stage, the server verifies authenticity and legality of meters using
their meter IDs and corresponding master keys. So, the security protocol is based on end-to-end
model which means that security responsibility lies on the server and meters, and any security
functions are transparent to nodes in the middle. This approach is based on the communication
technology in which routing is implemented independently of security function. A different
approach is also possible, in which case hop-by-hop authentication is implemented in nodes of
network [9].
The server and meters use a session key to set up a secure channel between them, and this
key is refreshed on a regular base or on request using the master key. And message integrity
and freshness can be provided by the message authentication code(MAC) computed from the
message concatenated with a nonce, the ID, and the master authentication key they share with.
The message authentication code (MAC) also verifies the authenticity of the sender. In order to
avoid computational overhead of any encryption technique, ether symmetric or asymmetric, we
choose Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication (HMAC) as an authentication algorithm.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we explain the security aspects for developing smart water meters. And also we
point out slight different features of water meters compared to power meters. And we show
security measures, taking practical implication into consideration. This is a typical approach for

encryption and authentication [10]. But this protocol can be easily expanded to several variants
that can be applied to the setup of secure channel between a meter and a server when we find an
optimum security protocol including key distribution.
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